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Johnson: Solitary Confinement and Juveniles

SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
PRE-TRIAL DETAINEES
Nicole Johnson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has long recognized that juvenile offenders
should not be held to the same standards of accountability or degrees
of punishment as adults.1 Despite recent changes in federal and state
laws prohibiting the use of solitary confinement for juvenile
offenders,2 it continues to be used as a routine form of punishment for
juveniles in most states. Although its use has been banned in New
York State prisons, county facilities within the state are not held to the
same regulations, and therefore continue to implement this harsh
punishment regardless of its detrimental impact on juveniles.3 Riker’s
Island Correctional Facility (“Riker’s”) stopped using solitary
confinement for juvenile offenders after the 2015 suicide of Kalief
Browder.4 Kalief was arrested at the age of sixteen, accused of stealing
a backpack from a delivery man.5 He appeared in Bronx criminal court
for the first time in May of 2010.6 The judge placed a three thousand
dollar bail on Kalief, despite his lack of a violent criminal background.7
* J.D. Candidate 2020, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, B.A. Forensic
Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice. I want to thank Professor Seplowitz for her
advice and guidance in writing this note. I would also like to thank Steven Fink and Michael
Morales for all of their help during the editing process.
1 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
2 Kevin Liptak, Obama Bans Solitary Confinement for Juveniles in Federal Prison, CNN
POLITICS (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/25/politics/obama-bans-juvenilesolitary-confinement/index.html.
3 Gary Gately, Juvenile Solitary Confinement: Modern Day ‘Torture’ in the US,
CORRECTIONS.COM (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.corrections.com/news/article/35445juvenile-solitary-confinement-modern-day-torture-in-the-us.
4 TIME: THE KALIEF BROWDER STORY (Weinstein Television 2017) [hereinafter THE KALIEF
BROWDER STORY].
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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He was then transferred to Riker’s, where he was incarcerated for
nearly three years.8 Kalief Browder spent more than seven-hundred
days of his incarceration in solitary confinement.9
Kalief was unjustly punished and placed in solitary
confinement on multiple occasions, without being provided a
misconduct hearing.10 While in solitary, he was confined to a small
cell for twenty-three hours per day, with only a metal bed, a sink and
a toilet.11 Inmates in solitary are not entitled to commissary, and
therefore, are only able to eat when the guards slide a tray of food
through a slit in the cell door.12 However, Kalief was often given half
eaten trays of food or not fed at all.13 Kalief described feeling isolated,
depressed and hopeless.14 He pleaded for help from the jail
psychiatrist, but his pleas fell on deaf ears.15 He talked to himself and
expressed to the psychiatrist that he felt like he was going insane.16
During his time in Riker’s, Kalief attempted suicide three times.17
Despite his suicide attempts, he was immediately brought back to
solitary confinement instead of receiving psychiatric treatment or
placed into general population.18 The correctional officers claimed that
they believed Kalief was exaggerating his symptoms and faking his
suicide attempts.19 Because there was no mandatory procedure in
effect, the guards had absolute discretion over Kalief’s access to
medical and psychiatric treatment.20 Furthermore, one of his most
important lifelines at the time, his legal aid attorney, made no attempt
to have Kalief released from solitary or receive medical treatment.21
Because of his refusal to join a gang, inmates and guards repeatedly
assaulted Kalief.22 Many of the assaults were captured on video at
Riker’s and showed guards clearly assaulting Kalief without cause and
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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allowing inmates to assault Kalief in their presence without attempting
to intervene.23
During the three years Kalief was incarcerated, he was
transported to court over thirty times just to face the disappointment of
prosecutorial delays and constant adjournments.24 Despite the right to
a speedy trial, New York’s “ready rule” is blatantly abused by
prosecutors to delay trial and force plea bargains on desperate inmates
with no means to bail out.25 Kalief was offered a plea on several
occasions but refused every time.26 He was told at one of his court
appearances that if he accepted the plea bargain, he could go home that
same day.27 Unlike most inmates, who take plea bargains to avoid the
delays and risks of trial, Kalief believed the system could still work for
him.28 He refused to take any deal and adamantly insisted on his
innocence.29 At his final court appearance, the prosecutors were forced
to reveal that the complaining witness, whom they had not had contact
with for an extended period of time, had left the country.30 The
prosecution asked for time to produce the witness but was not able to
convince him to return to the United States to testify.31 The court
denied the People’s request for additional time and Kalief was released
on May 30, 2013 at 2:00 a.m. and given nothing but a metro card and
the belongings he walked in with three years before as a 16-year old
boy.32
Although Kalief became a national advocate for prison reform,
after his release from Riker’s, he struggled to overcome the trauma
caused by solitary confinement and ultimately succumbed to the

23

Id.
Id.
25 George Joseph & Simon Davis-Cohen, Internal Documents Reveal How Bronx
Prosecutors are Taught to Slow Down Cases, APPEAL (Aug. 2, 2018), https://theappeal.org/int
ernal-documents-reveal-how-bronx-prosecutors-are-taught-to-slow-down-cases/; 33 N.Y.
JUR. 2D Crim. L.: Proc. § 1922, Duty of Prosecution to Communicate Readiness for trial to
Court and Defense Counsel, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2019) (explaining that in order
to comply with speedy trial requirements in New York—guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
and CPL (New York Criminal Procedure Law) § 30.30 (The Ready Rule)—a prosecutor has
ninety days from arraignment to be ready for trial).
26 THE KALIEF BROWDER STORY, supra note 4.
27
Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
24
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trauma he suffered while in prison.33 He received his GED after his
release from Riker’s, then enrolled in Bronx Community College
where he excelled for a few months until he suffered a mental break in
November of 2013.34 He was brought to St. Barnabas Hospital in the
Bronx, following an apparent suicide attempt.35 Kalief became
increasingly more paranoid and believed some of his professors were
undercover police officers.36 At home, he would sit in the dark and
unplug the television because he thought it was “watching him.”37 On
June 6, 2016, two years after his release, Kalief committed suicide in
his home, by hanging himself from the window of his childhood
bedroom.38
The effects of solitary confinement are irreversible and
detrimental to a person’s mental and physical wellbeing.39 It is a
severe and harsh form of punishment that the United Nations has
deemed to be inhumane and torturous.40 In a 2011 official press
release, the United Nations called for a ban on solitary confinement
except in very exceptional circumstances, and never for more than
fifteen days.41 The UN report also called for the complete prohibition
of the use of solitary confinement for juveniles, the mentally disabled,
and those in pre-trial detention.42 The report cited to the long-lasting
mental damage shown in scientific studies, which directly frustratesthe
purposes of rehabilitation.43
To force juveniles into solitary
confinement is undoubtedly cruel and unusual punishment.44 It also
contradicts the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Roper v.
Simmons45 and Graham v. Florida46 regarding the punishment of

33

Id.
Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Juan Méndez, Solitary Confinement Should be Banned in Most Cases, UN Expert Says,
UN NEWS (Oct. 18, 2011), https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/10/392012-solitary-confinement
-should-be-banned-most-cases-un-expert-says.
40 Id.
41
Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
46 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
34
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juvenile offenders.47 The Court has long recognized that juveniles
should be treated with a different standard of care than adults, and the
primary focus of the incarceration of juveniles is rehabilitation so that
they can learn from their mistake.48 Solitary confinement destroys the
juvenile’s potential rehabilitation.
Additionally, solitary confinement is being used egregiously
for pre-trial detainees of all ages, despite not being convicted of the
crime for which they are detained. Inmates who are presumed innocent
are often subjected to punishment based on largely uncorroborated
allegations made by correctional officers.49 Subjecting pre-conviction
detainees—people who are presumed to be innocent—to a punishment
which causes irreparable harm is a clear violation of their liberty
interests guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
liberty interests of juveniles are even further violated because, unlike
inmates in the general population, they are unable to receive an
education in solitary. While most adults have graduated and received
a basic education, juveniles are young and generally still attending
school.
Furthermore, the deleterious impact on juveniles is
significantly greater than it is on adults.
This Note will focus on juvenile detainees and their preconviction rights by examining three major factors that contributed to
the unjust confinement of Kalief Browder. It will address the effect of
solitary confinement of juvenile offenders beyond the pre-conviction
stage of legal proceedings. This Note will argue that the use of solitary
confinement for juvenile detainees who have not been convicted of a
crime offends the basic principles of due process. Additionally, it will
argue that the use of solitary confinement for juveniles violates the
Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that juvenile
offenders are subject to less severe punishments than adults because
youths are not fully developed mentally, more impulsive, and therefore
less culpable.50 Furthermore, the primary purpose of incarcerating
juvenile offenders is for rehabilitation rather than deterrence or

47
Id. (explaining that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of life without parole
on juvenile offender who committed homicide); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 (prohibiting
the death penalty for juvenile offenders).
48 Graham, 560 U.S. at 71; Roper, 543 U.S. at 567.
49 THE KALIEF BROWDER STORY, supra note 4.
50 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
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incapacitation.51 The use of solitary confinement is psychologically
destructive and defies the principles of rehabilitation.52
This Note will further argue that allowing prison or jail
personnel to serve as committee members for misconduct hearings also
violates due process. To permit the correction officers and prison
officials to decide if an inmate should be placed in solitary is the
equivalent of allowing the police who arrested the defendant to serve
as jurors at his trial.
This Note will be divided into five sections. Section II will
provide an historical overview of solitary confinement in the United
States. It will also examine New York’s new Raise the Age legislation
and its probable effect on the use of solitary confinement within the
state. Section III will argue that the United States Supreme Court
should declare the use of solitary confinement for juvenile offenders
to be unconstitutional and will discuss the applicable constitutional and
legal principles. Section IV will analyze prosecutorial misconduct and
abuse of the “ready rule” in state courts. Finally, Section V will
propose reform in both the state and federal prison systems regarding
solitary confinement for juvenile offenders.
II.

SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
A.

Historical Overview and Background

Solitary confinement has been used as a form of punishment in
the United States since the 1800s.53 It was originally intended as a
form of rehabilitation, whereby prisoners were supposed to think about
their crimes, read the Bible and repent.54 However, the harmful effects
of solitary confinement became evident not long after its
implementation.55 Only recently has the constitutionality of the

51

See Graham, 560 U.S. at 71.
Erica Goode, Solitary Confinement: Punished for Life, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/health/solitary-confinement-mental-illness.html; Ian
M. Kysel, Banishing Solitary: Litigating an End to the Solitary Confinement of Children in
Jails and Prisons, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 675, 707 (2016).
53 Madeleine Stern, The Evolution of Solitary Confinement in The United States, LAW
STREET MEDIA (July 2, 2014), https://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/health-science/evolutionsolitary-confinement-united-states/; Sandra Simkins, Juvenile Solitary Confinement, 296 N.J.
LAW. 22 (2015).
54 Stern, supra note 53.
55 Id.
52
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practice come into serious question.56 Most adult and juvenile
correctional facilities, as well as the United Nations,57 define solitary
confinement as confinement of 22-24 hours per day in isolation.58
Prison cells are eight feet by ten feet on average and made of cement,
with a hole in the metal door to slide meals through.59 Every effort is
made to minimize human contact.60 Cells are often stripped bare and
prisoners resort to habitual pacing around their cells to attempt to
maintain their sanity.61 Solitary confinement has been proven to
induce side effects such as visual and auditory hallucinations,
hypersensitivity to noise and touch, insomnia, paranoia, uncontrollable
feelings of rage and fear, distortions of time and perception, increased
risk of suicide and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.62 Despite all of the
proven adverse effects of solitary confinement, the use of this
punishment on children in local jails and state prisons is remarkably
high and difficult to track.63
President Barack Obama announced a series of executive
actions on restrictive housing in 2016, which banned the use of solitary
confinement of juveniles in federal prisons and urged states to model
the reforms implemented at the federal level.64 The President
referenced Kalief Browder and emphasized the deep psychological
impact this punishment has on young inmates, severely impairing their
ability to become functioning members of society again.65 The United
States is currently housing approximately 2.3 million inmates, with an
estimated 80,000 of them being held in solitary confinement in state
and local jails across the United States.66 Kalief’s death sparked
56 Id.; Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (inviting
Eighth Amendment challenges to the use of solitary confinement and emphasized its
especially harmful impacts on juveniles and the mentally disabled).
57 Supra note 53.
58 Kysel, supra note 52.
59 Stern, supra note 53.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Kysel, supra note 52.
64 Barack Obama, Why We Must Rethink Solitary Confinement, WASH. POST (Jan. 25,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barack-obama-why-we-must-rethink-solit
ary-confinement/2016/01/25/29a361f2-c384-11e5-8965-0607e0e265ce_story.html?utm_ter
m=.fbc53aba58fa; U.S DEP’T JUST., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE USE
OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING (Jan. 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/815561/dow
nload.
65 Obama, supra note 64.
66 Stern, supra note 53.
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reform in New York for juvenile offenders, but the majority of states
currently have no legislation in the area.67 Although there is a federal
ban on solitary confinement for juveniles, the Supreme Court has not
decided whether solitary confinement of juveniles who have not yet
been convicted of a crime is constitutional, rendering state prisons and
local jails virtually unregulated on its use. However, the Court set
some procedural standards for the use of solitary confinement for the
prison population in general in Sandin v. Conner68 and Wolf v.
McDonnell.69
In Sandin v. Conner, the Court held that the Due Process
Clause does not guarantee a prisoner the right to a misconduct hearing,
or any other procedural protections prior to being placed in solitary
confinement.70 However, the use of solitary confinement for preconviction detainees is only permitted for administrative or
disciplinary purposes.71 Administrators of state prisons and local jails
have an unsettling amount of discretion over who is put in solitary and
for how long.72 In some cases, inmates, especially those who have not
been convicted of a crime, are provided a misconduct hearing prior to
being placed in solitary confinement.73 However, these hearings are
conducted inside the institution by employees of the facility.74
Corrections officers can, and do, give inmates tickets arbitrarily which
can lead to a loss of privileges and “good time,”75 and often results in
sending the inmate to solitary confinement.76 Because of the broad
discretion of corrections officers and prison administrators, there is
67 Anne Teigen, States That Limit Or Prohibit Juvenile Shacking and Solitary Confinement,
NCSL (Aug. 16, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/states-thatlimit-or-prohibit-juvenile-shackling-and-solitary-confinement635572628.aspx.
68 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
69 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
70 Conner, 515 U.S. at 487.
71 Stern, supra note 53. Administrative purposes refer to instances where the inmate is in
danger of physical harm from other members of the general prison population and is placed in
isolation for his own protection. Disciplinary purposes refer to punishment implemented for
misconduct and behavioral infractions while an inmate is incarcerated.
72 Id.
73 See Conner, 515 U.S. at 485, Wolf, 418 U.S. at 545-46.
74 Conner, 515 U.S. at 475-76.
75 Good Time Credit Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/
g/good-time-credit/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2019). “Good Time” refers to the amount of time
deducted from time to be served in prison on a given sentence, at some point after the
prisoner’s admission to prison, contingent upon good behavior or awarded automatically by
the application of a statute or regulation. Id. Good time can be forfeited for misbehavior. Id.
76 Stern, supra note 53.
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virtually no oversight on the use of solitary confinement resulting in a
dangerous abuse of discretion which can send an innocent person to
solitary confinement for an indefinite amount of time based on the
decision of one officer.
Kalief was sent to solitary confinement for a ten month period
for fighting with another inmate.77 Although Kalief was seen on video
striking the first punch, approximately thirty inmates proceeded to
attack him during the altercation.78 Based on the video, prison guards
did very little to prevent the incident or protect Kalief.79 Immediately
after the fight, Kalief was brought directly to solitary confinement
without seeing a doctor or being provided any medical attention.80
Prison authorities conducted no investigation into the reasons for the
altercation or the identities of those involved.81 However, Kalief was
a target of a gang in Riker’s because of his refusal to join.82 Because
of his resistance to conforming to prison lifestyle, Kalief faced
constant threats and abuse from inmates and guards, which could have
ultimately led to the altercation.83
B.

Raise the Age Legislation

New York State has taken steps to reform the criminal justice
system’s harsh treatment of juveniles. After the death of Kalief
Browder and alleged prison misconduct at Riker’s, New York passed
legislation that became effective on October 1, 2018, which raised the
age of criminal liability for juvenile offenders.84 Prior to this
legislation, juveniles aged sixteen and up were treated as adults and
prosecuted in criminal court, regardless of the level of the offense of
which they were accused.85 Now, most juveniles, except those charged
with violent felony offenses, will have their cases heard in family
court.86 The new legislation will prevent a significant number of
77

THE KALIEF BROWDER STORY, supra note 4.
Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82
Id.
83 Id.
84 New York Raises the Age of Adult Criminal Responsibility, N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY (Apr. 7,
2017), http://nyassembly.gov/Press/20170407c/.
85 Id.
86 Id.
78
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juveniles from ever entering the criminal justice system.87 As of
October 2018, the following changes have taken effect: (1) all
misdemeanor charges are now handled in family court, (2) all felony
charges are initially handled in a new youth court part of the criminal
court that will be presided over by a family court judge, (3) non-violent
felony charges are subsequently transferred to family court, absent
exigent circumstances presented by the district attorney, and (4)
violent felony offenses remain in the youth part of the criminal court
and are subject to a three part test weighing the severity of the crime
to determine if the case is eligible for transfer to family court.88
Juveniles whose cases are determined to be ineligible under the three
part test are transferred to family court and treated as adults for
sentencing purposes, which places them at risk of being sent to adult
correctional facilities.89 All violent felony offenses are subject to this
test to determine if the case should be heard in criminal or family court.
Juveniles under seventeen years of age in New York’s county jails
were ordered to be moved to youth facilities in October 2018.90
Beginning in October 2019, all juveniles under eighteen years of age
will also be moved to youth facilities.91 Juvenile offenders are now
primarily held in youth facilities if convicted of a crime in New York.92
Since state prisons in New York have banned solitary confinement for
juveniles, they are only subject to solitary confinement if they are
incarcerated in juvenile facilities, which remain dangerously
unregulated because they are county facilities.93 Juveniles who are
sentenced as adults in criminal court are sent to state adolescent
offender facilities, subject to the supervision of the Office of Children
and Family Services.94 The use of solitary confinement in these
facilities is likely prohibited because they are regulated by the state,
unlike juvenile detention centers run by the county. However, because
the use of these facilities is relatively new, it is unclear whether the
Office of Children and Family Services is enforcing the prohibition of
solitary in state prisons within adolescent offender facilities. The use

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of solitary confinement in county facilities varies per county. Kings
County, for example, allows juveniles to be placed in solitary
confinement if it is “necessary to prevent significant physical harm to
the juvenile detained or to others when less restrictive alternatives
would be ineffective.”95 This standard grants detention officers
substantial deference, allowing for a predictable abuse of discretion.
In a recent report by an independent monitor, the county was found to
have illegally used solitary confinement for juveniles fifteen times
between July and November of 2018.96
The conditions of solitary confinement in juvenile detention
centers are virtually the same as those in jails and prisons, and the
centers have been the focus of an abundance of civil rights lawsuits on
behalf of juvenile detainees across the country.97
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

The deleterious effects of isolation on prisoners have brought
the constitutionality of solitary confinement under scrutiny in recent
court decisions across the country.98 Cases such as Kalief Browder’s
have generated a growing awareness of the torturous and inhumane
conditions of solitary confinement in U.S. correctional institutions.
The detrimental effects of solitary confinement are even greater for
juveniles and contradicts the Court’s well-established principle of
attempting to rehabilitate juvenile offenders. The Supreme Court has
noted in countless decisions that the basis for punishing juveniles
should always be for rehabilitation rather than incapacitation.99
Solitary confinement significantly diminishes the chances of
rehabilitation into the community.100 The American Psychiatric
Association, the American Public Health Association, the National
Alliance on Mental Illness, the Society of Correctional Physicians, and
95 Aaron Kunkler, Kings County is Still Using Solitary Confinement for Juveniles, BrothelKenmore Reporter, BOTHELL-KENMORE REP. (Mar. 26, 2019), http://www.bothellreporter.com/news/king-county-is-still-using-solitary-confinement-on-juveniles/.
96 Id.
97 See Peoples v. Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d 294, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Davis v. Ayala, 135
S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015).
98 Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 299.
99 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570
(2005).
100 Lauren Kirchner, Why Solitary Confinement Hurts Juveniles More Than Adults, PAC.
STANDARD (Oct. 9, 2014), https://psmag.com/news/solitary-confinement-hurts-juvenilesadults-92054.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 [2019], Art. 5

710

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

Mental Health America have all issued formal policy statements
opposing solitary confinement due to the significant psychological
harm inflicted.101 Inmates subject to solitary confinement are seven
times more likely to harm themselves after being released from prison
than those held in general population.102 The reasoning behind the
Court’s decisions is especially true in the case of pre-conviction
juveniles.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that no
person shall be “deprive[d] . . . of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”103 Utilizing Kalief Browder’s case as an example to
apply the principles of due process, it seems inherently wrong to allow
a juvenile, who has not been convicted of a crime, to spend over seven
hundred days in solitary confinement. Kalief was denied his right to
an education and deprived of three years of his childhood. He was then
put in torturous conditions and abused and ignored. This was all done
to a juvenile whose case was ultimately dismissed. Kalief, like so
many others, had no procedural protections in place to prevent this
injustice from happening.
A.

Due Process: Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

Solitary confinement used on pre-trial detainees contradicts the
presumption of innocence that is guaranteed to every defendant
accused of a crime. Inmates who have not been convicted of a crime
should not be subjected to the same punishments inside of jails as
inmates who have been convicted. Juveniles are particularly affected
because they are deprived of any form of education while in solitary.104
Although receiving an education is not a fundamental right guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal protection clause provides
that all similarly situated individuals should be treated alike subject to
varying standards of review.105 Although school age children are all
guaranteed the same access to education, the Court applies rational
basis to determine if the disparity of the treatment is supported by a
101

Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 299.
Id.
103 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
104 Molly McCluskey, What if This Were Your Kid?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 24, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/juvenile-solitary-confinement/548933/.
105 Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2006); Michael Salerno, Reading is
Fundamental: Why No Child Left Behind Act Necessitates Recognition of a Fundamental
Right to Education, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 509 (2007).
102
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legitimate state interest.106 Juvenile offenders placed in solitary
confinement experience gaps in their education which leave them
unprepared or even unable to return to school after being released.107
Between 2015 and 2016 over eighty juveniles were held in solitary on
a regular basis at the Onondaga County Justice Center located in
Syracuse, New York.108 They were isolated for twenty-three hours per
day and given an optional high school equivalency packet to complete
without any educational instruction or guidance.109
Because
correctional institutions have absolute discretion in placing an inmate
in solitary confinement, many of these juveniles were sent to solitary
due to minor disciplinary infractions. The impact and long-term
detrimental effects caused by solitary confinement are so severe that
the decision to punish a juvenile in such a manner calls for judicial
intervention.
1.

Pre-trial Detainees

In A.J ex rel. L.B. v. Kierst, the Eighth Circuit held that “the
due process standard applied to juvenile pretrial detainees should be
more liberally construed than that applied to adult detainees.”110 The
plaintiffs in Kierst filed a class action against the Jackson County
Juvenile Justice Center alleging civil rights violations, due to
conditions of solitary confinement they were exposed to while
incarcerated.111 The court noted that the appropriate test to apply to
determine the constitutionality of solitary confinement for pre-trial
detainees would be under the Fourteenth Amendment as opposed to
the Eighth Amendment.112 Furthermore, when a juvenile is being held
in a juvenile detention center, rather than an adult facility, the
appropriate standard of measurement would be to use the Fourteenth
Amendment and not the Eighth Amendment because the conditions

106

Sanchez, 454 F.3d at 33.
McCluskey, supra note 105.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 A.J. ex rel. L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1995).
111 Id. at 856. Plaintiffs complained of prison overcrowding, being forced to sleep on floor
mattresses due to lack of available beds and various issues which led to an unfair trial.
112 Id. at 854. The Eighth Amendment protects inmates from cruel and unusual punishment,
whereas the Fourteenth Amendment provides juveniles who have not been convicted of a
crime a due process interest in freedom of unnecessary bodily restraint.
107
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leading to confinement may be drastically different.113 Some juveniles
are held in youth facilities due to a “runaway status” or from
delinquency petitions that are not criminally based.114 In both
instances, the inmate has not been convicted of a crime; therefore,
placing him in solitary confinement infringes an individual’s liberty
interest guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment..115 “[J]uveniles . . . , who have not been convicted of
crimes, have a due process interest in freedom from unnecessary
bodily restraint which entitles them to closer scrutiny of their
conditions of confinement than that accorded convicted criminals.”116
In Santana v. Collazo, the court weighed the legitimacy of the state’s
interest in implementing solitary confinement on juveniles against the
deleterious impacts that it has on them.117 The court held that if the
state can show a legitimate reason for placing juveniles in solitary, then
solitary confinement will withstand constitutional scrutiny. However,
“the possibility that some juveniles . . . have been and will continue to
be subjected to unpleasant and perhaps physically and psychologically
damaging restrictions on their liberty that are not reasonably related to
legitimate government interests in imposing those restrictions” is
troubling.118 The court in Collazo applied a rational basis standard in
analyzing the constitutionality of solitary confinement on juvenile
offenders and acknowledged that solitary is a disciplinary measure
which results in a substantial curtailment of an individual’s freedom.119
However, the court failed to directly address whether solitary
confinement of juveniles substantiates a legitimate interest or if it
serves as an additional form of punishment.120
In R.G. v. Koller, the plaintiffs, three LGTB juveniles, were
subjected to solitary confinement due to their sexual orientation.121
Each of the plaintiffs endured physical and verbal abuse from guards
while incarcerated at Hawaii Youth Correctional Facility (“HYCF”).122
Many of the inmates housed at HYCF were placed there for non113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Id.
Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1182.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1181.
See id. at 1172.
R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Haw. 2006).
Id. at 1140.
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criminal offenses, such as skipping school or running away from
home.123 Juveniles are often held in detention centers for non-criminal
offenses but are nevertheless subject to solitary confinement.124
Inmates who are not charged with or convicted of a criminal offense
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth
Amendment. 125 The court held that holding the inmates in isolation in
an alleged attempt to protect them from other inmates was not an
acceptable professional practice and violated their due process
rights.126 The court in Koller based its holding on several prior rulings
which concluded that, except in extreme circumstances, the use of
solitary confinement for juveniles is a violation of the Due Process
Clause.127
2.

Misconduct Hearings

Although the Supreme Court held in Wolf v. McDonnell that
prisoners may claim the protections of the Due Process Clause, it also
said that those rights are subject to restriction due to the nature of
prison environments.128 Those restrictions also include the right to an
attorney, the right to cross examine one’s accusers, and the right to
present one’s own defense at prison misconduct hearings.129 Because
the defendant is subject to “the most serious deprivations” in a criminal
trial, the Court reasoned that prisoners should not receive the same
procedural due process rights as free citizens, even if they have not yet
been convicted of a crime.130 Additionally, the Court said that the
potential for havoc inside a prison is increased by the ability to cross
examine accusers,131 and emphasized the importance of prison
institutions having discretion over their own disciplinary measures.132
The Court was concerned about dangerous conditions inside prisons
123

Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1155.
125 Id. at 1154.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1154-55.
128 Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567 (1974).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 568. If a prisoner were allowed the ability to cross examine his accuser, he would
be made aware of who made accusations against him leading to a disciplinary infraction, which
in prison is likely to incite a physical altercation and make the informer a target among
inmates.
132 Id.
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that could be exacerbated by “constitutional impediments.”133
However, as discussed in the dissenting opinion, the Court implied that
the Constitution requires that people, including prisoners, be afforded
the right to present their own defense at misconduct hearings by calling
witnesses and providing evidence.134 Although the Court advised
prison officials to grant prisoners such rights, it declined to hold that
they are required to do so.135 Several years later, the Court, in Bell v.
Wolfish, narrowed this decision and held that placing an inmate in
solitary confinement infringes on the inmate’s due process rights if
done with an express intent to punish and without a legitimate
institutional interest.136 Therefore, correctional officers can simply
claim that a prisoner was placed in isolation for a legitimate purpose
without any procedural safeguards preventing them from abusing this
discretion.137
In Sandin v. Conner, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the
Due Process Clause does not necessarily afford a prisoner the right to
a misconduct hearing or any other procedural protections prior to being
placed in solitary confinement.138 The appellant in Conner was placed
in solitary based on allegations of misconduct.139 Although he was
placed in isolation, fully bound in leg restraints and waist chains, and
only allowed fifty minutes per day out of his cell to exercise and
shower, the Court held that that the conditions of his confinement were
not substantially different from those of the general prison
population.140 However, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent,
the majority of prisoners who were not placed in solitary were given
eight hours per day outside of their cells, interacted with other inmates
and were able to work or take classes.141 Although the majority based
its decision in part on the assertion that solitary confinement did not
pose an atypical hardship on the prisoner in this case, the dissent
argued that the majority’s reasoning actually led to the opposite
133

Id.
Id. at 581 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136 Id.; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
137 Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 581 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that
prison officials have absolute discretion when placing an inmate in solitary confinement and
that judicial intervention is not required).
138 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S 472, 487 (1995).
139 Id. at 494 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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conclusion, and that the prisoner had a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause.142 In determining if an inmate has been deprived
of a procedurally protected liberty, the Court has relied on the nature
and severity of the deprivation.143
Conner was held in solitary for thirty days after he was
convicted of a crime, for which he received a sentence of thirty
years.144 Kalief had been placed in solitary for over seven hundred
days, had not been convicted of a crime, and his case was ultimately
dismissed.145 The severity of the deprivation of Kalief’s liberty interest
far outweighed that of Conner’s. The Court’s decision in Conner relied
on the conclusion that the inmate did not suffer an atypical hardship as
a consequence of his time in solitary. The conditions and
circumstances of Kalief’s time in solitary are distinguishable from
Conner’s, rendering the holding inapplicable to Kalief’s case. The
Court reasoned that placing the inmate in solitary confinement without
a misconduct hearing in Conner did not deprive him of any due process
rights because the conditions of the inmate’s confinement did not
present an atypical hardship for him based upon the duration of time
spent in solitary and the conditions of his confinement in comparison
to the rest of the prison population in that facility.
Misconduct hearings are inherently unfair because they are
held by correctional officers and employees of the same institution
accusing the inmate of misconduct. Therefore, whether the inmate
spends thirty or seven hundred days in solitary confinement, the
correctional institution is imposing a severe punishment without any
fair proceedings and is given too much discretion which often results
in arbitrarily placing inmates in solitary. The Court in Sandin v.
Conner emphasized the importance of allowing prisons to impose
punishments free from too much government interference or
guidelines due to the nature of the dangerous and chaotic
environment.146 However, the Court’s decision jeopardizes the liberty
interests of pre-trial detainees because it grants too much deference to
prison officials, allowing inmates who are presumably innocent to be
placed in solitary confinement without judicial review. The Fourteenth
Amendment prevents states from depriving any person of “life, liberty,
142
143
144
145
146

Id. at 487.
Id. at 493 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 475.
THE KALIEF BROWDER STORY, supra note 4.
Conner, 515 U.S. at 480.
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or property, without due process of law.”147 Since prison misconduct
hearings are unduly biased and because implementing court
proceedings prior to placing an inmate in solitary would not be
efficient or feasible, the only reasonable solution should be to ban the
use of solitary confinement for juveniles in its entirety.
Although the defendant in Sandin v. Conner was not a juvenile,
the same procedural guidelines apply for all prisoners.148 Correctional
facilities ultimately have full discretion over their own disciplinary
hearings and can place inmates in solitary for administrative and
disciplinary reasons, without any intervention by courts or
legislatures.149
B.

Eighth Amendment Concerns

Juvenile offenders are not usually held to the same standards of
accountability as adults and, therefore, are not typically subject to the
same severe punishments. Punishments such as life without parole and
the death penalty are unconstitutional when imposed on juveniles, in
part because neither gives juveniles any chance of rehabilitation in
their lifetime.150 Prison officials ignore basic principles that the Court
has mapped out when implementing punishment. The unique harms
caused to juveniles, along with the distinct legal differences between
adults and juveniles, call for a higher standard in conditions of
confinement because the ability to rehabilitate is significantly
diminished due to the irreversible damage resulting from solitary
confinement.
1.

Roper and Graham

In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that it is
unconstitutional to sentence juveniles to death, reasoning that juveniles
lack self-control, and are vulnerable and susceptible to their
surroundings.151 Punishments for juveniles should therefore not be as
severe as they are for adults because “signature qualities of youth are
transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness
147
148
149
150
151

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Conner, 515 U.S. at 472.
Id.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Id. at 570.
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that may dominate in younger years may subside.”152 In Graham v.
Florida, the Court further asserted its view on the treatment of juvenile
offenders in the criminal justice system, declaring it unconstitutional
to sentence a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole.153 The
Court’s decision in this case relied on the principles of rehabilitation
as a basis of punishment as opposed to deterrence, incapacitation or
retribution, when dealing with juvenile offenders.154 Additionally, the
Court stated that “[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth
Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’
youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.”155 The application
of these principles in the context of the detrimental impacts of solitary
confinement on youths calls the constitutionality of this practice into
question. Although the Court has not yet decided whether a juvenile
should be subject to solitary confinement, prior decisions relating to
the punishment and sentencing of juveniles have protected them156
from the harsher and more permanent punishments which are imposed
on adults. “Traditionally, juvenile detainees are afforded greater
constitutional protection” than adult detainees.157 The Court prohibits
life without parole and the death penalty for juveniles because both of
these forms of punishment contradict the underlying purpose to
rehabilitate juvenile offenders. Similarly, due to the irreparable harm
to juveniles caused by solitary confinement, the chance of
rehabilitation is significantly diminished.158
2.

Eighth Amendment Cases

The literature on the deleterious effects of solitary confinement
is “virtually unanimous in its conclusion: prolonged supermax solitary
confinement can and does lead to significant psychological harm.”159
To assess the constitutionality of solitary confinement under the Eighth
Amendment the Court looks at factors such as the length of time that
the inmate spends in isolation and the likelihood of mental
152

Id.
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
154 Id.
155
Id. at 76.
156 Id.; see Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
157 A.J. ex rel. L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1995).
158 Peoples v. Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d 294, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
159 See, e.g, McCluskey, supra note 105; Kirchner, supra note 101; U.S DEP’T JUST.,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 64.
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deterioration.160 The Court has been reluctant to hold that solitary
confinement for adult inmates is unconstitutional; however, “[i]t
would not be unreasonable to assume that society’s conscience might
be shocked by the conditions of confinement imposed on a juvenile in
an isolation cell, when it would be unwilling to label the same
treatment, given to an adult, cruel and unusual.”161 In Turner v.
Palmer, the plaintiff, a sixteen year old girl, filed suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for violations arising out of her incarceration at an Iowa
juvenile detention center.162 The teenage girl was placed in a small
cement cell in complete isolation for weeks at a time, with only a small
thin mat to sleep on.163 She was held in solitary confinement for 289
out of the 528 days she was incarcerated, and prohibited from
classroom instructions, homework, reading material or any outside
communication.164 During this period, the plaintiff repeatedly cried
and banged her head against the wall.165 The court denied defendant’s
motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity and held that the
plaintiff sufficiently alleged Eighth Amendment violations due to the
conditions and extent of the plaintiff’s confinement.166 The court based
its reasoning on the decision in A.T. ex rel. Tilman v. Harder.167 In
Harder, the plaintiffs, two juvenile males, filed suit seeking injunctive
relief due to conditions of solitary confinement at Broome County
Correctional Facility in New York.168 Plaintiffs were held in 8-foot by
10-foot cells for approximately 23 hours per day and deprived of
education and related support services.169 Correctional officers
admitted to placing juveniles in solitary confinement at their own
discretion for infractions such as not standing for count and throwing
water in the cafeteria.170 The plaintiffs cited to numerous cases where
the courts have determined the confinement of adults to be
160

Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1179.
162 Turner v. Palmer, 84 F. Supp. 3d 880, 881 (2015) (Plaintiff was a juvenile delinquent
and deemed a child in need of assistance at age 16 and was thereby ordered to be placed in the
Iowa Juvenile Home.).
163 Palmer, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 881.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166
Id.
167 A.T. ex rel. Tilman v. Harder, 298 F. Supp. 3d 391, 398 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding
juvenile offenders are afforded more liberal due process protections than adults).
168 Id.
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unconstitutional and persuasively argued that juveniles are far more
vulnerable than adults to the potential long-term effects of solitary
confinement.171 The court granted injunctive relief based on a showing
of Eighth Amendment violations.172
In Peoples v. Annucci, prisoners filed a class action against the
New York State Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,
challenging solitary confinement practices across the New York State
prison system.173 Although the suit encompassed inmates of all ages,
the settlement was groundbreaking and highlighted the disturbing
abuse of discretion displayed by prison officials when determining if
an inmate should be placed in solitary confinement and the length of
the isolation. Peoples was sentenced to two years in solitary
confinement for maintaining legal documents in his cell deemed to be
contraband by correctional officers.174 Counsel representing Peoples
joined complaints of additional inmates, Richardson and Fenton, and
an historic settlement was reached on behalf of thousands of
prisoners.175 Similar to Peoples, Richardson was also sent to solitary
for three years over documents that he had in his cell.176 Fenton was
placed in solitary for two years for reporting a sexual assault which
was deemed to be unsubstantiated by correctional officers, for helping
another inmate buy sneakers and for sending a sample of food to the
court claiming it had been tampered with.177 The court found the
settlement agreement to be fair and reasonable but also encouraged
further reform which was not addressed in the settlement negotiations,
such as enhanced mental diagnosis and treatment, improved food
quality, warmer clothes and cells and reforms to protect inmates from
disciplinary techniques that were used against them.178

171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id.
Id.
Peoples v. Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d 294, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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While solitary confinement can be destructive to an adult, it can
shatter a juvenile.179 Its impact on juveniles is irreparable.180 The
practice is cruel and inhumane and often leads to neurological and
psychological damage due to the torturous conditions inmates are
forced to endure.181 Juveniles who spend prolonged periods of time in
solitary are more likely to commit suicide as a result.182 Kalief
Browder’s case emphasizes the devastating consequences resulting
from this senseless punishment.183
IV.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND THE STOP THE CLOCK
GAME

It would be hard to imagine how any person could be in jail for
three years without ever going to trial. However, this is a common
problem that stems from prosecutorial misconduct.184 In New York, a
prosecutor has ninety days from arraignment to be ready for trial.185
However, prosecutors can say that they are not ready at arraignment
and request a one-week adjournment, but may not be given another
court date for two months due to court congestion.186 In those seven
weeks in excess of what the prosecutors asked for, the clock stops
running, which results in the defendant’s having only one week
accounted for in speedy trial considerations. When the next court date
comes, the prosecutors may do the same thing and keep pushing the
clock.187 After they exhaust several not ready delays, they start asking
for adjournments that do not count against them such as the
unavailability of a witness or a conflict with another case on the same

179 Brittney A. Puckett, Solitary Confinement of Juveniles and Our Evolving Standards of
Decency: A Look at Recent Action Taken by the Court, Congress, the President and the States,
38 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 63, 65 (2016).
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Joseph & Davis-Cohen, supra note 25; 33 N.Y. JUR. 2D Crim. L.: Proc., supra note 25,
§ 1922.
185 Joseph & Davis-Cohen, supra note 25; 33 N.Y. JUR. 2D Crim. L.: Proc., supra note 25,
§ 1922.
186 Joseph & Davis-Cohen, supra note 25; 33 N.Y. JUR. 2D Crim. L.: Proc., supra note 25,
§ 1922.
187 Joseph & Davis-Cohen, supra note 25; 33 N.Y. JUR. 2D Crim. L.: Proc., supra note 25,
§ 1922.
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day.188 Prosecutors are trained and encouraged to delay court
proceedings as long as possible to put pressure on the defendant to take
a guilty plea.189 Kalief appeared in court over thirty times while
incarcerated.190 He was offered deals but refused to take a plea bargain
and adamantly maintained his innocence.191 Kalief was repeatedly sent
to solitary confinement while awaiting the day that the People would
eventually announce they were ready for trial. However, this day never
came because the People were never ready for Kalief’s case, and the
People had no hope to be ready for trial in the future. The complaining
witness left the country at an unknown time and was not in contact
with the prosecution. The People did not have a victim or witness to
produce and could not in reality go forward with trial. The judge
finally dismissed the charges against Kalief after the prosecution
revealed that they could not contact the complaining witness; however,
the harm that Kalief suffered from his extensive time in solitary
confinement was irreparable at that point. His time on solitary
confinement caused him irreparable harm, ultimately leading to his
death. Such prosecutorial misconduct alone is unjust, particularly
when a juvenile is subjected to the inhumane conditions of solitary
confinement before trial.
VI.

PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSION

Although New York has made tremendous improvement in
decreasing the use of solitary confinement of juveniles in correctional
institutions, substantial reform is still desperately needed. The federal
government, along with several states, has banned the use of solitary
confinement for juvenile detainees.192 New York should follow the
federal model and ban the use of solitary confinement for juvenile
offenders within the state. Juvenile detention centers are not
prohibited from imposing solitary confinement on juveniles because
they are typically county facilities, not subject to the regulations of
188

Joseph & Davis-Cohen, supra note 25; 33 N.Y. JUR. 2D Crim. L.: Proc., supra note 25,
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190 THE KALIEF BROWDER STORY, supra note 4.
191 Id.
192 Anne Teigen, States That Limit Or Prohibit Juvenile Shacking and Solitary
Confinement, NCSL (Aug. 16, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice
/states-that-limit-or-prohibit-juvenile-shackling-and-solitary-confinement635572628.aspx.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019

23

Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 [2019], Art. 5

722

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

state prisons. Although New York’s Raise the Age legislation should
serve as a model for other states to follow in their prosecution of
juvenile offenders, its use of solitary confinement is an archaic
punishment that goes against the rehabilitative effects that confinement
is supposed to enhance.
Moreover, in Davis v. Ayala, Justice Kennedy invited Eighth
Amendment challenges to the use of solitary confinement for juvenile
offenders, indicating that the Court may finally be willing to make a
determination on the issue.193 Intervention from the Supreme Court is
desperately needed to prohibit the use of solitary confinement in all
states. Despite the lack of litigation in the area, there seems to be a
general consensus that solitary confinement causes irreparable harm to
inmates, especially juveniles. In his concurring opinion in Ayala,
Justice Kennedy called for litigators to challenge the constitutionality
of holding all persons in solitary confinement in U.S. prisons and
specifically referenced the tragic death of Kalief Browder.194
Correctional facilities use biased disciplinary hearings to decide if a
prisoner should be placed in solitary confinement without due process
of law. The use of solitary confinement infringes upon pre-conviction
detainees’ due process rights, and the long-term effects are irreparable.
Therefore, the use of solitary confinement for juvenile offenders—
especially those who have not been convicted—should be prohibited
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

193
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